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ABSTRACT
Tobacco companies are increasingly turning to trade and
investment agreements to challenge measures aimed at
reducing tobacco use. This study examines their efforts
to inﬂuence the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP), a major
trade and investment agreement which may eventually
cover 40% of the world’s population; focusing on how
these efforts might enhance the industry’s power to
challenge the introduction of plain packaging.
Speciﬁcally, the paper discusses the implications for
public health regulation of Philip Morris International’s
interest in using the TPP to: shape the bureaucratic
structures and decision-making processes of business
regulation at the national level; introduce a higher
standard of protection for trademarks than is currently
provided under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights; and expand the coverage
of Investor-State Dispute Settlement which empowers
corporations to litigate directly against governments
where they are deemed to be in breach of investment
agreements. The large number of countries involved in
the TPP underlines its risk to the development of
tobacco regulation globally.
INTRODUCTION
International trade and investment law is consti-
tuted by bilateral, regional/plurilateral (regional)
and multinational agreements (box 1) which create
legal obligations between parties and specify fora
for the resolution of disputes between them. The
tobacco industry has a long history of using trade
agreements to expand into new markets.1–7 Recent
evidence suggests that major tobacco companies are
increasingly turning to trade and investment agree-
ments to challenge measures aimed at reducing
tobacco use.8–11 Current industry efforts in this
area centre on policies designed to reduce the
effects of pack branding on consumer demand
(such as generic packaging and large pictorial warn-
ings) and take three broad forms: support for
national governments’ complaints to the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) (box 1);12 direct legal
action against national governments using
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) under
trade and investment agreements11 13–16 (box 1);
and lobbying national governments to shape the
terms of new international agreements so as to
extend the coverage of ISDS and generally
strengthen tobacco companies’ capacity to chal-
lenge public health policy.11 16 17 This paper
focuses on the last of these and speciﬁcally on
Philip Morris International’s (PMI) efforts to shape
the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP). In doing so it
aims to examine the implications of the TPP for
plain packaging legislation.
BACKGROUND
The TPP
The TPP has its origins in a proposal made by the
USA in 1998 to Australia, Chile, New Zealand and
Singapore for a free trade agreement which would
encourage other Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation
(APEC) members to liberalise their trade.18 The ini-
tiative led to the Trans-Paciﬁc Strategic Economic
Partnership Agreement which contained an acces-
sion clause permitting other countries to join and
create the basis for a larger agreement covering the
entire APEC region.18–20 In 2007, negotiations
began for the TPP, a signiﬁcantly expanded version
of the agreement, encompassing a larger group of
countries.19 Negotiating states currently include the
USA, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Peru,
Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Canada and
Mexico.17 21 22 Their aim is to produce an agree-
ment that other countries in the APEC grouping will
adopt, creating a Free Trade Area of the Asia Paciﬁc
which the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) hopes will eventually cover 40% of the
world’s population.23 In November 2012, Thailand
became the latest state to formally express an inter-
est in joining.24
Described by its critics as a bill of rights for large
corporations, which fundamentally shifts the
balance of power between business and government,
the TPP follows other investment treaties in extend-
ing protection to a wide range of proprietary inter-
ests, including contract rights, intellectual property
(IP) and market share.10 25–30 Negotiations have
been conducted almost entirely in secret. A decision
to keep negotiating texts conﬁdential until 4 years
after a deal is completed has opened up the process
to criticism that it is effectively allowing negotiators
to rewrite domestic regulation without democratic
scrutiny.31 The fact that representatives of corpora-
tions in the USA serve as ofﬁcial advisers, have full
access to draft texts of the agreement, and a special
role in negotiations has reinforced concerns that the
ﬁnal draft of the agreement will radically extend cor-
porate property rights.31
PMI’s interest in and efforts to shape the TPP
While there is some evidence to suggest that other big
tobacco companies have been using the anonymity
provided by industry associations to inﬂuence the
TPP,32 PMI’s objectives for the agreement are publicly
accessible. In its 2010 response to a US Federal
Register notice,33 the company called for three main
proposals: ‘harmonization of legitimate, science-based
regulations’, an investor-state dispute mechanism, and
a comprehensive ‘Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)-plus’ IP chapter
comprising ‘a high standard of protection for
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trademarks’.33 Each of these requests is reﬂected in subsequent
leaked draft texts of the TPP agreement.34–36
The following analysis is divided into four substantive sec-
tions. The ﬁrst three examine how each of PMI’s three propo-
sals is likely to strengthen the tobacco industry’s capacity to
prevent the introduction of plain packaging. The fourth brieﬂy
examines the extent to which a tobacco-speciﬁc exception
announced by the USTR, but not yet formally proposed, might
nullify the effect of these proposals.
‘HARMONIZATION OF LEGITIMATE, SCIENCE-BASED
REGULATIONS’: BETTER REGULATION, POLITICAL ACCESS
AND INFORMATION LEVERAGE
Leaked text of a draft TPP chapter on ‘regulatory coherence’
suggests that negotiating parties are seeking to use the TPP to
stipulate guidelines for regulatory rulemaking and review along
the lines of the Better Regulation and regulatory review agenda
in the European Union (EU) and USA.37 38 This represents a
departure from existing investment agreements and is part of a
global process of regulatory reform that draws heavily on US
administrative law and its cost-beneﬁt approach to regulatory
review.23 39–41 The formal purpose of the chapter is to establish
rules for regulatory formation and review that will reduce the
likelihood of TPP countries creating and maintaining regulations
that are inconsistent with the agreement.42 Some of the guide-
lines proposed are consistent with well-informed, methodical
decision-making.41 However, they also promise to increase
tobacco companies’ capacity to inﬂuence health policy by
increasing their access to the policymaking process, augmenting
their ability to challenge regulation and reinforcing their existing
information advantage.23 35 43–48
Three provisions in the draft chapter are likely to facilitate
tobacco companies’ policy access. The ﬁrst is a recommendation
that parties to the TPP establish a national coordinating body
with the power to review whether regulatory measures adhere
to ‘good regulatory practices’.35 49 A similar system of review is
practiced by the Australian Ofﬁce of Best Practice Regulation, a
regulatory oversight body in Australia which monitors how gov-
ernment departments and agencies develop regulation.50 In
2010, the ofﬁce concluded that a draft regulatory impact assess-
ment prepared by the Department of Health and Ageing for the
Australian plain packaging law did not satisfy best practice
guidelines. The policy was subsequently adjudged ‘non-
compliant’ and earmarked for a postimplementation review
within 2 years of it taking effect.23 51 Reviews such as this
provide tobacco companies with increased opportunities to
Box 1 International Trade and Investment Law, Tobacco Industry Litigation, and Pack Branding
Trade and Investment Law
The key institution in the governance of international trade and investment is the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The organisation
oversees a large number of multinational agreements which member countries must ratify on accession,133 and, unusually for a trade
and investment regime, has its own standing body to settle disputes (see box 3 and below in the main text). The Organisation operates
alongside a large number of bilateral and regional agreements. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are more signiﬁcant in quantitative
terms (estimated at 2833 at the beginning of 2012). However, the annual number of new bilateral agreements is in decline, while efforts
to develop and extend regional agreements, such as the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP), are intensifying.54 134
A number of factors work to harmonise the protection of foreign investments by creating overlaps and structural interconnections
between agreements. Most-favoured-nations (MFN) provisions in bilateral and regional agreements grant investors rights to more
favourable legal protections or entitlements in other investment agreements.11 An investor covered by an agreement with a MFN clause
can therefore invoke the beneﬁts granted to third-party nationals by another agreement of the host state and import them into its
relationship with the host State.135 Furthermore, some agreements, such as the BIT between Hong Kong and Australia (Hong
Kong-Australia BIT), require parties to observe any other obligations they may have entered into which may potentially extend to general
obligations in international treaties (such as TRIPS).11 Finally, many states base agreements on model investment treaties that provide a
core set of protections such as expropriation and compensation (which encompass measures that diminish or interfere with property
rights) and fair and equitable treatment (which can cover the failure to respect an investor’s legitimate expectations, arbitrary,
discriminatory or unreasonable treatment, and denial of procedural fairness).11 16 136 137
Tobacco Industry’s use of Trade and Investment Law against Regulations affecting Pack Branding
Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 and implementing regulations (the 2011 Act) are subject to a complaint in the WTO and a
notice of claim from Philip Morris Asia (PM Asia) under the BIT between Hong Kong and Australia.69 70 138–141
The complaint in the WTO, initiated by Ukraine, underlines the importance of three WTO agreements to plain packaging—the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.138–141 In the context of the present paper, it should be noted that the USA is making efforts
to strengthen Technical Barriers to Trade standards and intellectual property (IP) protection under the TPP.42
Among other things, PM Asia’s complaint under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT claims that the 2011 Act represents an expropriation of
its IP and violation of its rights under the Treaty to fair and equitable treatment (see below in the main text).70 PM Asia are also
claiming that the 2011 Act breaches Australia’s international obligations by violating TRIPS, the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.42
In addition to the above, a subsidiary of Philip Morris International (PMI) has ﬁled a request for arbitration against Uruguay alleging
that a requirement that tobacco packages include graphic images of the health consequences of smoking, a mandate that health
warnings cover 80% of the front and back of cigarette packages, and a single presentation requirement (which prohibits marketing of
more than one tobacco product under each brand) violate several provisions of the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT.14 142 Porterﬁeld and Byrnes
note that PMI are asserting an expansive interpretation of fair and equitable treatment, including a right to a ‘stable and predictable
regulatory framework.’143 The request for arbitration also alleges that the single presentation requirement constitutes an expropriation of
Philip Morris’s trademarks by prohibiting their use on multiple brands.
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challenge and shape regulation.23 In the case of the TPP, which
recommends that existing, as well as new, regulation is regularly
appraised, these opportunities are likely to be substantial.49 The
second, a recommendation that the national coordinating body
ensures that all ministries with an interest in a particular regula-
tion participate in its development, is likely to increase involve-
ment of non-health ministries who are more likely to promote
tobacco industry interests.52 The third provision is a recommen-
dation for collaboration between governments and ‘their
respective stakeholders’, including dialogue, meetings and
exchange of information.35 49 British American Tobacco played
a key role in a broad alliance of multinational corporations pro-
moting a similar requirement for stakeholder consultation in EU
policymaking and the tobacco industry has subsequently used
such requirements in its efforts to undermine Article 5.3 of the
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control which,
among other things, seeks to reduce tobacco industry access to
policymakers.37 53
A recommendation in the draft to integrate impact assess-
ments into policy may also enhance tobacco companies’ inﬂu-
ence over policymaking. Existing research on British American
Tobacco’s efforts to embed impact assessments into the policy-
making processes of the EU indicates that their primary aim was
to formalise their ability to exploit information asymmetries
that commonly characterise business-government relations.37 38 41
Finally, the draft chapter also proposes that governments ensure
their regulatory bodies provide access to ‘supporting documen-
tation’ relating to regulatory measures, analyses and data. Such
detailed disclosure exacerbates existing information asymmetries
between business and government, thereby increasing the indus-
try’s leverage to challenge decision-making.23
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Increasing numbers of bilateral and regional agreements have
included dispute settlement clauses permitting investors (typically,
although not exclusively, corporations) to bring their own claim
against governments.54–56 Capital exporting states’ continuing
preference for ISDS provisions in international agreements is
attributed to the belief that overseas corporations are more likely
to prevail before an investment tribunal than in domestic courts57
and their increasing signiﬁcance is underlined by a ﬁvefold
increase in cases under the World Bank’s international arbitration
body, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), between 1999 and 2012.25 In practice, ISDS is
either overseen by a supervising institution, such as the
ICSID54 58 or simply follows established rules, such as those of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.58
A leaked draft of the TPP’s investment chapter suggests that clai-
mants will be free to submit claims under the TPP to either the
ICSID or under UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules or, where claimant
and respondent agree, to any other arbitration institution or
under any other arbitration rules.34
One reason PMI is likely to favour ISDS stems from its cap-
acity to discourage parties from introducing plain packaging and
produce what is commonly described as ‘regulatory chill’.59
Although this phenomenon is characteristic of WTO rules and
dispute settlement, ISDS is likely to produce a greater chilling
effect for several reasons. The ﬁrst concerns the existence of a
pro-business decision-making culture cultivated by arbitral rules
and working practices. Arbitral adjudicators are typically inter-
national investment lawyers drawn from commercial practice
with no expertise in public health which raises questions about
their competence to judge the efﬁcacy of public health regula-
tion and take account of the public policy consequences of their
decisions.54 60–63 Arbitral rules also allow lawyers to rotate
between roles as arbitrators and advocates for investors in a way
that provides limited protection for conﬂicts of interest.25 54 64
Estimates suggest over 50% of arbitrators act as counsel for
investors in other cases while just 10% act for states.54 Conﬂicts
can arise when arbitrators have ongoing interests in other
cases.54 65 Moreover, arbitrators are typically appointed and
compensated by the parties to the dispute,54 which may bias
decisions in favour of corporate actors who frequently use arbi-
tration.54 Although repeated appointments of an arbitrator by
the same company or law ﬁrm are commonly addressed in arbi-
tral rules, repeated appointments by the same side of the
investor-state divide are not.65 These concerns are consistent
with the criticism that arbitrators broadly interpret the language
contained in investment treaties in a way that prioritises trans-
national corporations’ economic interests over governments’
right to regulate.63 66 67
Another reason ISDS is likely to produce a more powerful
chilling effect than the WTO’s dispute settlement process con-
cerns the fact that companies can initiate complaints directly,
rather than having to lobby a state to act on their behalf. One
consequence of this is that the remedies arbitral tribunals can
impose on legislating states (compensation or injunctive relief )
are linked to the losses incurred by companies from breaches of
agreements. In the case of compensation the sums claimed can
be vast. Under the Australia-Hong Kong Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT) (see box 1), Philip Morris Asia (PM Asia) is using
ISDS to seek ‘billions of (Australian) dollars’ for potential losses
arising from the 2011 Plain Packaging Act and new graphic
health warning regulation.68–70 The chilling effect is likely to be
greater still for low and middle income countries as the calcula-
tion of compensation is not tied to their ability to pay.54 By con-
trast, under the WTO’s dispute settlement process (box 3),
complainant states are effectively limited to imposing retaliatory
sanctions commensurate with the value of trade lost resulting
from the legislating state’s non-compliance with General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO rules.71–74
In pure economic terms, this makes WTO dispute settlement a
weaker deterrent to governments considering plain packaging
legislation, particularly where the trade in tobacco between
legislating and complainant states is not signiﬁcant, the volume
of trade lost to a complainant state is small,75 76 or where com-
plainant states’ economies are relatively undeveloped, as this
limits their capacity to retaliate in kind.77 78
Tobacco companies’ problems in working through member
states under the WTO’s system of dispute settlement is com-
pounded by the fact that many governments may be averse to
acting on behalf of tobacco companies. Similarly, low and
middle income countries may have concerns about disrupting
relations with a more powerful trading partner or a geostrategic
ally.77 79–82 By reducing the pool of states that tobacco compan-
ies can rely on to initiate a complaint these factors can limit the
potential size of the sanctions on legislating states. These limita-
tions of WTO dispute settlement for the tobacco industry are
illustrated by the current complaint against Australia in the
WTO. Although Ukraine, the lead complainant in this case, is
the site of a PMI subsidiary that employs 1400 workers, it has
not traded any tobacco with Australia since at least 2005.83–85
ISDS is also likely to create a larger deterrent effect because
of the greater uncertainty inherent in ISDS decisions.86 In prin-
ciple, neither adopted WTO panel and Appellate Body reports,
nor decisions of ISDS investment tribunals are formally binding
on third parties not involved in the adjudicated dispute.60
However, in contrast to ISDS tribunals, the WTO operates a de
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facto system of precedent.87 88 While ISDS tribunals cite previ-
ous cases in support of decisions, they do not have to base their
decisions on those of previous cases. This produces competing
lines of case law which provide a jurisprudential basis for tribu-
nals to arrive at different conclusions in effectively identical
cases.11 58 89 90 The absence of an appellate body in investment
arbitration and the limited scope to have decisions reviewed is
likely to compound this effect.58 80 82
The lack of transparency in investor-state disputes presents an
additional source of uncertainty. Proceedings are held in-camera
and once a ruling is made by a tribunal there is no general
requirement to publish the award or the basis upon which it is
made.58 91 The World Bank’s ICSID is now required to make
public information on the registration of all requests for concili-
ation or arbitration, the date and method of termination of pro-
ceedings, and, with the consent of the parties, reports of
conciliation commissions and awards (where consent is not
forthcoming excerpts of the legal reasoning behind tribunal
decisions are still published).92 By contrast, no organisation
keeps track of United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law disputes.93 This lack of transparency creates an infor-
mation imbalance, which puts low income and middle income
countries at a disadvantage as investors with the ﬁnancial
resources to hire major international law ﬁrms specialising in
this area enjoy greater access to this disparate body of arbitral
decisions through professional networks.58 94
These above issues increase the litigation risks for states,
which is likely to have a bearing on the decision of low income
and middle income countries to withdraw innovative tobacco
control measures, or not to innovate at all. The problem is com-
pounded by the high administrative costs involved, which,
according to a recent survey by the Organisation of Economic
Co-Operation and Development, average over US$8 million per
case.3 54 58 95 96 Moreover, rules for allocating costs among
parties are ﬂexible and considered to be an additional source of
uncertainty.54
‘A HIGH STANDARD OF PROTECTION FOR TRADEMARKS’:
EXTENDED PROTECTION FOR IP
TRIPS and ‘TRIPS-plus’
Shortly after TRIPS came into effect, the USA and other devel-
oped nations began negotiating for broader and more extensive
coverage, increased harmonisation and stronger enforcement
mechanisms.55 97 98 Efforts were also made to weaken ‘ﬂexibil-
ities’ and ‘special and differential treatment’ granted to develop-
ing countries in a process commonly referred to as
‘TRIPS-Plus’.16 55 97–100 In the present case, PMI’s reply to the
US Federal Register indicates that it speciﬁcally called for a
‘TRIPS-plus’ chapter to allow it to challenge the introduction of
plain packaging.33
The reason behind the request may stem from concerns
within PMI that the protection TRIPS gives tobacco companies
over pack design is weak or equivocal.101 102 Tobacco compan-
ies have consistently argued that plain packaging contravenes
several TRIPS provisions; including Articles 15.4 and 20 and
Paris Convention Article 6 quinquies (B).103–108 However, there
is a measure of consensus among academic lawyers that the
rights granted under TRIPS Article 15.4 and Article 6 quinquies
of the Paris Convention are conﬁned to the registration of trade-
marks, rather than their use and are, therefore, unaffected by
plain packaging.102 109–113 There is also a measure of consensus
that the strongest argument raised by tobacco companies is that
plain packaging violates TRIPS Article 20. Article 20 provides
that the use of a trademark in the course of trade should not be
unjustiﬁably encumbered by special requirements.114 Plain pack-
aging is clearly a ‘special requirement’ which is detrimental to
the capability of a trademark to distinguish between tobacco
products from different companies.102 However, it may be justi-
ﬁable by virtue of being necessary for public health.11 This
interpretation of justiﬁable is reinforced by Article 8(1), which
permits WTO members to adopt measures necessary to protect
public health provided they are broadly consistent with other
provisions within TRIPS.102 106 Tobacco companies have argued
that the proviso merely afﬁrms the right of WTO members to
make public policy and does not empower them to breach the
provisions of TRIPS.11 103 104 The provision has not yet been
the focus of a WTO ruling.115 However, the industry’s inter-
pretation contradicts Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health (see box 2) and is inconsistent with
the WTO Appellate Body’s (see box 3) interpretation of
necessary in the context of Article XX(b) of GATT 1994
(see box 4).116 117
Expropriation and minimum standard of treatment
Although a leaked draft chapter on IP proposed by the USA sug-
gests that it is proposing language which might create an
afﬁrmative right to use trademarks under certain conditions, in
practice this might not prove as important to the prevention of
plain packaging than the protections provided to IP in the TPP’s
chapter on investment.11 34 36 118 A leaked draft of that chapter
deﬁnes investment broadly as applying to any assets whose char-
acteristics include ‘a commitment of capital or other resources,
expectation of gain or proﬁt, or assumption of risk’,34 which
potentially extends the expropriation and minimum standards
of treatment provisions in the chapter to the use of trademarks
and, therefore, pack design.
Draft Article 12.12 within this chapter requires compensation
for ‘indirect expropriation’ of ‘covered investments’ where the
effect is to reduce the value of a company’s investments and its
future proﬁts.34 Some tribunals have set the threshold at which
compensation is payable at a signiﬁcant and substantial loss,
while others have required the near destruction of the value of
the investment.11 119 PM Asia’s complaint under the Hong
Kong-Australia BIT (box 1) seems to have been drafted with this
latter line of cases in mind, arguing that the 2011 Act ‘virtually
eliminates PM’s branded business by expropriating its valuable
intellectual property’, transforming the company to a ‘manufac-
turer of commoditized products with the consequential effect of
substantially diminishing the value of PM Asia’s investments in
Australia’.69 70 Two (presumably alternative) draft annexes to
the chapter aim to limit the use of indirect expropriation.
Annex 12-C proposes a ‘case-by-case’ inquiry that considers the
economic impact of public policy, the extent to which it inter-
feres with ‘reasonable investment-backed expectations’, and the
Box 2 Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration
Paragraph 4 of the Declaration states that TRIPS ‘does not and
should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect
public health’ and ‘should be interpreted in a manner
supportive of World Trade Organisation members’ right to
protect public health’. Although the Declaration has been
argued to have the same effects as an authoritative
interpretation,144 its substantive scope is restricted to access to
medicines for pandemics.11
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‘character of government action’. Annex 12-D, by contrast,
refers to interference with intangible property rights or interests
in an investment that are either ‘severe’ or ‘for an indeﬁnite
period’ and ‘disproportionate to the public purpose.’34 These
terms are untested and subject to exceptions (‘except in rare cir-
cumstances’) which provide arbitrators with some discretion to
rule against policies made in good faith to protect public health,
and, therefore, create uncertainty in how the protection will be
interpreted.34
The broad deﬁnition of investment also potentially extends
the ‘minimum standard of treatment’ protection under draft
Article 12.6.1 to trademarks use.34 The minimum standard
includes ‘fair and equitable treatment’34 which has been inter-
preted by tribunals under existing agreements to include a right
to a ‘stable and predictable business environment’ that does not
stymie investors’ expectations concerning the proﬁtability or
value of their investments.119 Factors considered relevant to the
measure include the contribution of the investment to the
country, whether the policy is considered arbitrary or unreason-
able, and the status of government policy at the time the invest-
ment is made.11 119 Tribunal decisions on the scope of the
protection are divergent and, as such, the standard creates a
further source of uncertainty.119
THE TOBACCO-SPECIFIC EXCEPTION
Despite the risks these provisions pose in extending tobacco
companies’ IP rights, the USTR has announced that the author-
ity of countries to enact measures aimed at reducing tobacco use
will be protected under the TPP.120–124 US government agencies
are formally prohibited from seeking to reduce or remove other
nations’ non-discriminatory restrictions on tobacco market-
ing.125–128 Consequently, the USTR has produced a draft pro-
posal which would include language in the ‘general exceptions’
chapter partially carving out tobacco in the TPP.129 Although
not formally proposed in negotiation at the time of writing, a
recently published (May 2012) USTR factsheet on the proposal
states it would allow health authorities to adopt regulations that
impose ‘science-based restrictions on speciﬁc tobacco products/
classes in order to safeguard public health’.129 130 The USTR
claims that this language will create a ‘safe harbour’ for tobacco
regulation, providing ‘greater certainty’ that the provisions in
the TPP will not be used to prevent regulation aimed at promot-
ing public health, ‘while retaining important trade disciplines
(national treatment, compensation for expropriations and trans-
parency) on tobacco measures.’129
In its present form the degree of protection this proposal
would give to public health policy is unclear. The proposal
covers regulations adopted by a health authority and, therefore,
potentially does not extend to legislation or regulations by non-
health authorities on matters relating, for example, to tax and
IP.131 In addition to this, the proposal does not seem to extend
to claims alleging that regulation has had the effect of expropri-
ating a company’s assets without providing compensation.131
The ‘science-based’ test also creates uncertainty. It represents a
qualitatively different test to Article 8(1) of TRIPS and may
impose a more rigid process of evaluation than that outlined by
the Appellate Body in relation to Article XX(b) of GATT 1994
(box 4). The health exception in GATT applies to measures that
Box 4 Appellate body’s report into Brazil’s measures
affecting imports of retreaded tyres102 116 117
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX(b)
exempts a Member’s measure from compliance with the
provisions of GATT where that measure is ‘necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health.’117 In 2007 the World
Trade Organisation (WTO)’s Appellate Body outlined the
following principles which, if subsequently applied to Article 8,
are unlikely to favour Ukraine’s current complaint in the
WTO:102 116 117
▸ Certain complex public health or environmental problems
may be tackled only with a comprehensive policy comprising
a multiplicity of interacting measures;
▸ In the short term it may prove difﬁcult to isolate the
contribution to public health of one speciﬁc measure from
those attributable to the other measures that are part of the
same comprehensive policy;
▸ Results obtained from certain preventive actions to reduce
the incidence of diseases may manifest themselves only after
a certain period of time and may only be capable of
evaluation after a period of time;
▸ An import ban under Article XX(b) can only be justiﬁed
where it brings about a material contribution to the
achievement of its objective;
▸ A material contribution can be established with reference to
evidence or data but also on the basis of quantitative
projections in the future, or qualitative reasoning based on a
set of hypotheses that are tested and supported by sufﬁcient
evidence;
▸ The selection of a methodology to assess a measure’s
contribution is a function of the nature of the risk, the
objective pursued, and the level of protection sought, and
depends on the nature, quantity and quality of evidence
existing at the time the analysis is made.117
Box 3 World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute
settlement process145
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) consists of all WTO
members and has the responsibility for settling disputes under
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO rules. It
establishes panels of experts to consider cases in response to
requests from complainant states. The panel produces a report
which, in practice, becomes the DSB’s ruling at which point it
can be appealed by either side. Appeals are adjudicated by
three members of a rotating seven-member Appellate Body
broadly representative of the WTO’s membership. The appeal
can uphold, modify or reverse the panel’s legal ﬁndings and
conclusions. Rejection of an appeal report by the DSB is only
possible by consensus.
If the respondent state fails to comply with a ruling within a
reasonable period, it is required to enter into negotiations with
the complainant state to determine mutually acceptable
compensation. In the absence of an agreement the complainant
can apply to the DSB for permission to impose trade sanctions
against the respondent. In principle, the sanctions should be
imposed in the same sector as the dispute. If this is not
practical or effective, the sanctions can be imposed in a
different sector under the same agreement or, in exceptional
cases, under another WTO agreement.
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are ‘necessary.’ The WTO’s Appellate Body has ruled that a
necessary measure must contribute to the health objective, but
the contribution need not be proven with ‘science-based’ evi-
dence (see box 4). In this regard, the proposed exception may
be narrower than the existing health exception. Moreover, by
creating uncertainty and providing another avenue for tobacco
companies to litigate it is likely to discourage parties from intro-
ducing plain packaging.131
CONCLUSION
Trade and investment agreements have been criticised for trans-
ferring state decision-making from the national to the inter-
national level and providing transnational corporations with a
supranational court of appeal with which to challenge the cap-
acity of governments to introduce new public health legisla-
tion.27 PM Asia’s continuing action against the Australian
government under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT given its defeat
in the Australian High Court over the 2011 Act illustrates this
point well.70 132 PMI’s formal request to the USTR that the
TPP be used to extend IP rights, harmonise the process of regu-
latory formation, and provide a comprehensive system of ISDS
reﬂect the contents of leaked drafts of the TPP agreement.
These suggest the TPP will extend IP protection to trademark
use, strengthen corporate inﬂuence in regulatory formation, and
provide tobacco companies with extensive powers to litigate
against governments directly. Although the extension of IP pro-
tection is subject to exceptions for measures aimed at promoting
public health, the precise scope of these exceptions is unclear.
Consequently, all three measures are likely to increase the
tobacco industry’s policy inﬂuence and to deter governments
from introducing plain packaging, albeit in different ways. First,
by increasing litigation risk for legislating states, the extension
of IP protection to trademark use will increase tobacco compan-
ies’ power to present the costs associated with plain packaging
and other policies affecting pack design as prohibitively expen-
sive. Likewise, proposals such as regulatory review, stakeholder
consultation and the use of impact assessments provide the
industry with a range of tools to access and feed information
into health policymaking. Combined with the TPP’s proposal
for states to provide access to ‘supporting documentation’ relat-
ing to regulatory measures, analyses and data, which may
exacerbate existing information asymmetries between states and
multinational corporations, these reforms are likely to facilitate
challenges to regulatory innovation under international law.23
By underpinning these measures with ISDS, which increases the
economic costs associated with litigation and institutionally
embeds uncertainty in treaty interpretation, the TPP provides a
powerful new toolbox for the industry in preventing the intro-
duction of plain packaging and other innovative health
measures.
Finally, the lack of transparency in the TPP negotiations illus-
trates the limitations inherent in the state-centric nature of
Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control. Article 5.3 aims to limit tobacco industry involvement
in health policy by, among other things, requiring parties to the
Convention to make interactions between the tobacco industry
and public ofﬁcials as transparent as possible. The USA is a non-
party to the Convention and is, therefore, under no obligation
to make public any involvement of tobacco companies, either
directly or through third parties, in TPP policymaking. This
enables the tobacco industry to undermine APEC states’ efforts
to implement Article 5.3 and inﬂuence health policy remotely
through TPP negotiations.
Key messages
▸ The TPP threatens to increase the tobacco industry’s policy
inﬂuence and increase the litigation risks of plain packaging
legislation and other innovative tobacco control measures.
▸ Parties to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
should consider how Article 5.3 can be implemented to
prevent tobacco companies from inﬂuencing public health
policy remotely through trade and investment agreements.
▸ Agreements involving non-party states raise additional
complications which need to be raised during treaty
negotiations.
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